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QUANTUM ERROR-CORRECTION CODES ON
ABELIAN GROUPS
MASSOUD AMINI
Abstract. We prove a general form of bit flip formula for the
quantum Fourier transform on finite abelian groups and use it to
encode some general CSS codes on these groups.
1. Introduction
In classical public key cryptography the security of the cryptosys-
tems are based on the difficulty of calculating certain functions. A
famous example is the ASP cryptosystem which was based on the as-
sumption that factoring large integers could not be done in polynomial
time (on classical computers). The typical situation in these systems
is that two parties (Bob and Alice) whish to communicate in secret.
Instead of sharing a secrete key in advance (which confront us with the
relatively difficult issue of secret key distribution), Bob announces a
public key which is used by Alice to encrypt a message, sent to Bob.
The encryption is done in a clever way so that if a third party (Eve)
wants to decrypt it a non feasible amount of calculation is needed.
Bob, however, has a secret key of his own which enables him to do the
encryption in real time.
Quantum cryptography has a different way of keeping things secret.
The difficulty of some calculations is replaced by the impossibility of
some calculations according to the laws of quantum mechanics. The
first example of the quantum key distribution protocol was published
in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [BB] which is now called BB84 code.
The security of this protocol is gauranteed by the impossibility of mea-
suring the state of a quantum system in two conjugate bases simultane-
ously. A complete proof of security against any possible attack (i.e. any
combination of physical operations permitted by the laws of quantum
mechanics) was given later [LC], [M], [BBMR]. A simple proof of this
fact is proposed by Shor and Preskill in [SP]. They first showed the se-
curity of a modified Lo-Chau code which is a entanglement purification
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protocol and uses EPR pairs. Then they showed that it is equivalent
to a quantum error correcting code, namely the CSS code introduced
independently in [CS] and [S]. This later code was constructed on the
vector space {0, 1}n after the classical binary codes. Finally they re-
duced the CSS code to BB84. The basic idea of this final step was to
avoid the quantum memory and reduce the encoding and decoding to
classical computations.
The encoding part in the CSS protocol in [SP] was based on the
following property of linear codes: If C is a linear code then the value
of 1
|C|
∑
y∈C(−1)x.y is 1 or 0 when x ∈ C⊥ or x /∈ C⊥, respectively. This
is used to show that the Hadamard gate transforms the state
1√|C|
∑
y∈C
(−1)a.y|y + b〉
to the state
(−1)a.b√|C⊥|
∑
y∈C⊥
(−1)b.y|y + a〉
In this paper we generalize this observation to the setting of arbitrary
finite abelian groups (note that in linear coding theory {0, 1}n is treated
as a vector space, but it is also an abelian group). We show that for
a finite abelian group G, a subgroup H , and elements a, b ∈ G, the
quantum Fourier transform sends the state
1
|H|
∑
z∈H
χa(z)|z + b〉
to the state
χa(b)
|H⊥|
∑
z∈H⊥
χb(z)|z + a〉
where {χx : x ∈ G} is a Fourier basis for G and H⊥ = {x ∈ G : χx(y) =
1 (y ∈ H)}. We use this to build a version of CSS code adapted to
the group case. We show that the calculations of [SP] carries over
and we can reduce this code to a generalized version of BB84 built on
group G. The paper continues as follows. In section 2 we introduce
the quantum Fourier transform on a finite abelian group G and prove
the above statement. In section 3 we discuss quantum error correction
codes and introduce the CSS code on G. In the last section we above
mentioned two protocols and show their equivalence.
2. quantum Fourier transform
Let G be a finite abelian (additive) group. Let H = CG be a Hilbert
space with the orthonormal basis {|x〉 : x ∈ G}, called the standard
basis of H. There is a natural action of G on H by translation
x : |y〉 7→ |x+ y〉 (x, y ∈ G)
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Note that CG is also an algebra under the convolution product
(
∑
x∈G
cx|x〉) ∗ (
∑
y∈G
dx|y〉) =
∑
z∈G
(
∑
x+y=z
cxdy)|z〉
A character on G is a nonzero group homomorphism χ : G→ T, where
T is the multiplicative group of the complex numbers of modulus 1.
The values χ(x) are |G|-th roots of unity. The set Gˆ of all characters
on G is an abelian group with respect to the pointwise multiplication
and is called the dual group of G. It is well known that |Gˆ| = |G|
and so we may index the elements of Gˆ by elements of G, and write
Gˆ = {χx : x ∈ G}. Indeed in the finite group case we have, Gˆ ≃ G, so
we may assume that χxχy = χx+y and χx(y) = χy(x), for each x, y ∈ G,
and χ0 ∼= 1. Also we have the Schur’s orthogonality relations
1
|G|
∑
x∈G
χy(x)χz(x) = δyz (y, z ∈ G).
For each x ∈ G cosider the state
|χx〉 = 1|G|
∑
y∈G
χx(y)|y〉,
then the above orthogonality relations imply that {|χx〉 : x ∈ G} forms
a orthonormal basis for H, called the Fourier basis of H. This basis is
translation invariant in the sense that
x|χy〉 = χy(x)|χy〉 (x, y ∈ G)
The quantum Fourier transform on G is the unitary operator FG :
H → H defined by
|x〉 7→ 1√|G|
∑
y∈G
χx(y)|y〉 (x, y ∈ G)
Note that one can extend this map by linearity on H (see [J]). Two
classical examples are G = Zm where
χk(ℓ) = e
2πik/m k, ℓ = 0, . . . , m− 1
and G = {0, 1}n where
χx(y) = (−1)x.y (x, y ∈ {0, 1}n)
in which FG is the usual discrete Fourier transform DFTm on Zm and
the Hadamard transform Hn, respectively.
Each element of Gˆ could be extended by linearity to a linear func-
tional on CG. This is indeed a multiplicative functional with respect
to the convolution product and Gˆ exhusts the set of all multiplicative
linear functionals [R]. The well known Peter-Weil theorem applied to
the finite group G, tells us that Gˆ is an orthonormal basis for the linear
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dual space (CG)∗. In particular (CG)∗ ≃ CGˆ. For each subset H ⊆ G,
CH is a subspace of CG, generated by {|x〉 : x ∈ H}. We put
H⊥ = {x ∈ G : χx(y) = 1 (y ∈ H)}
If H is a subgroup of G (we write H ≤ G), then H⊥ ≃ (G/H )ˆ [R]. This
notion goes in parallel with the notion of the orthogonal complement
L⊥ for a subspace L ≤ CG. Of course (CH)⊥ and CH⊥ are not the
same (even the dimensions don’t match).
Lemma 2.1. If H ≤ G and x ∈ G\H⊥, then there is K ≤ H with
[H : K] = 2 and x0 ∈ H of order two such that H = K ∪ K + x0,
K ∩K + x0 = ∅, and χx(x0) = −1.
Proof Consider the subspace L ≤ CH with L⊥ =< CH⊥, x >. Then
L has codimension 1 in CH , so we can write H = K ∪ {x0} for some
0 6= x0 ∈ H and K ⊆ H with L = CK and CH =< L, x0 >. Since
0 ∈ K so x0 ∈ K+x0 and therefore H ⊆ K∪K+x0. But H is a group,
so K ∪K + x0 ⊆ H , that is H = K ∪K + x0. Now if K ∩K + x0 6= ∅,
then x0 ∈ L, which is not possible. To see that K is a subgroup of H
take x, y ∈ K, then x−y ∈ H = K ∪K+x0, but x−y ∈ K+x0 would
imply that x0 ∈ CK = L which is again impossible, so x − y ∈ K.
Now K has exactly two cosets in H , so [H : K] = 2 and the group
generated by x0 is isomorphic to the quotient group H/K of order 2,
so x0 has order 2. In particular χx(x0) = 1 or −1. But x ∈ (CK)⊥ so
χx(k) = 1, for each k ∈ K. Hence χx(x0) 6= 1 (otherwise x ∈ H⊥), and
so χx(x0) = −1.QED
Lemma 2.2. For each x ∈ G and H ≤ G we have∑
y∈H
χx(y) =
{ |H| if x ∈ H⊥
0 otherwise
}
Proof If x ∈ H⊥ then∑
y∈H
χx(y) =
∑
y∈H
1 = |H|
If x /∈ H⊥, then with the notation of the above lemma∑
y∈H
χx(y) =
∑
y∈K
χx(y) +
∑
y∈K+x0
χx(y)
=
∑
y∈K
χx(y) +
∑
y∈K
χx(y + x0)
=
∑
y∈K
(1 + χx(x0))χx(y) = 0.QED
For each x, y ∈ G let |x〉〈y| be the rank one operator on H = CG
defined by
(|x〉〈y|)|z〉 = 〈y|z〉|x〉 (z ∈ G)
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then one can decompose the quantum Fourier transform as a combina-
tion of rank one operators.
Lemma 2.3. FG =
1√
|G|
∑
x,y∈G χx(y)|y〉〈x|.
Proof If FG is defined by above formula, then for each z ∈ G
FG|z〉 = 1√|G|
∑
x,y∈G
χx(y)|y〉〈x|z〉 = 1√|G|
∑
x,y∈G
χx(y)δxz|y〉
=
1√|G|
∑
y∈G
χx(y)|y〉.QED
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.1. Let a, b ∈ G and H ≤ G and consider the state
|ψ〉 = 1√|H|
∑
z∈H
χa(z)|z + b〉
then
FG|ψ〉 = χa(b)√|H⊥|
∑
z∈H⊥
χb(z)|z + a〉.
Proof If we use the above lemma and the fact that
χz+b(y) = χz(y)χb(y), χz(y) = χy(z) (y, z ∈ G)
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we have
FG|ψ〉 = 1√|G||H|
∑
x,y∈G
χx(y)|y〉〈x|
∑
z∈H
χ−a(z)|z + b〉
=
1√|G||H|
∑
x,y∈G
∑
z∈H
χx(y)χ−a(z)|y〉〈x|z + b〉
=
1√|G||H|
∑
y∈G
∑
z∈H
χz+b(y)χ−a(z)|y〉
=
1√|G||H|
∑
y∈G
∑
z∈H
χz(y)χb(y)χ−a(z)|y〉
=
1√|G||H|
∑
y∈G
∑
z∈H
χy(z)χb(y)χ−a(z)|y〉
=
1√|G||H|
∑
y∈G
∑
z∈H
χb(y)χy−a(z)|y〉
=
1√|H|⊥
( 1
|H|
∑
z∈H
χy−a(z)
)(∑
y∈G
χb(y)|y〉
)
=
1√|H|⊥
∑
y−a∈H⊥
χb(y)|y〉
=
1√|H|⊥
∑
z∈H⊥
χb(z + a)|z + a〉
=
χb(a)√|H|⊥
∑
z∈H⊥
χb(z)|z + a〉
=
χa(b)√|H|⊥
∑
z∈H⊥
χb(z)|z + a〉.QED
3. quantum error correcting codes
A quantum channel Q is a trace preserving completely positive linear
map
Q : Hin →Hout
We can decompose Q as
Q(ρ) =
∑
i∈I
AiρA
†
i ,
where Ai’s are error operators with
∑
i∈I A
†
iAi equal to the identity
operator. In general Q is not invertible, unless restricted to a subspace.
A subspace C ≤ Hin is called a quantum error correcting code(QECC)
for Q if there is a decoding operator D such that
DQ|ψ〉〈ψ| = ψ〉〈ψ| (ψ ∈ C),
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or equivalently
PCA
†
kAℓPC = αkℓPC (k, ℓ ∈ I),
for some constants αkℓ, where PC is the projection operator onto C [K].
Now let G be a finite abelian group and Gn = G×· · ·×G (n copies).
A subgroup C ≤ Gn with k = |C| is called a [n, k]G code. Elements of
Gn are words x = (x1, . . . , xn) and the words in C are called codewords.
For x, y ∈ Gn, the distance d(x, y) is the number of coordinates in
which x and y differ. The weight of a word x is the number wt(x) of
its nonzero coordinates, where zero is the identity of G. A [n, k]G code
with minimum distance d is called a [n, k, d]G code. When G = (F2,+),
this is nothing but the classical binary code [n, log2(k), d].
Suppose C1 and C2 are [n, k1]G and [n, k2]G codes with C2 ≤ C1 and C1
and C⊥2 both correct t errors. We define a quantum code CSSG(C1, C2)
capable of correcting errors on t qubits. For a codeword x ∈ C1 put
|x+ C2〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|x+ y〉
Note that |x+ C2〉 only depends on the coset of C1/C2 to which x+ C2
belongs. Also |x + C2〉 is orthogonal to |y + C2〉, if x and y are repre-
sentatives of different cosets of C2. The quantum code CSSG(C1, C2) is
defined on the vector space spanned by the states |x + C2〉 , where x
ranges in C1. In particular the dimension of CSSG(C1, C2) is |C1|/|C2|.
Suppose that a bit flip and a phase flip errors have occured. These
are described by two ”n bit” vectors e1, e2 ∈ Gn. If |ψ〉 = |x + C2〉 is
the original state, then the corrupted state would be
|ψ1〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χe2(x+ y)|x+ y + e1〉
as in the binary case, the encoding process starts with introducing a
ancilla (of sufficient length) initially in the all zero state |0〉. We apply
the parity matrix H1 for the code C1 taking |x+ y + e1〉|0〉 to
|x+ y + e1〉|H1(x+ y + e1〉 = |x+ y + e1〉|H1e1〉
where the above equality follows from the fact that x+ y ∈ C1, and so
H1(x+ y) = 0. The effect of this operation on |ψ1〉|0〉 is
1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χe2(x+ y)|x+ y + e1〉|H1e1〉
Now error detection for the bit flip error is simply done by measuring
the ancilla. This gives us H1e1, from which we can infer e1, since C1
can correct up to t errors. The result of discarding the ancilla is the
state
|ψ2〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χe2(x+ y)|x+ y + e1〉
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Next applying the U †e1 : |z〉 7→ |z − e1〉 unitary gate to this state, we
obtain
|ψ3〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χe2(x+ y)|x+ y〉
The next step is applying the quantum Fourier transform FGn = FG ⊗
· · · ⊗ FG (n times) to |ψ3〉. Using Theorem 2.1 (applied to Gn with
H = C2, a = −e2, and b = x) we get
|ψ4〉 = FGn |ψ3〉 = χe2(x)FGn
( 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χe2(y)|y + x〉
)
=
χe2(x)χ−e2(x)√
|C⊥2 |
∑
y∈C⊥
2
χx(y)|y − e2〉
=
1√
|C⊥2 |
∑
y∈C⊥
2
χx(y)|y − e2〉
As for the error detection for the bit flip, we introduce an ancilla and
apply the parity matrix H2 for C⊥2 to obtain H2(−e2), and correct the
phase flip error (now showing up as a bit flip error), obtaining the state
|ψ5〉 = 1√|C⊥2 |
∑
y∈C⊥
2
χx(y)|y〉
Again applying FGn and using Theorem 2.1 (with H = C⊥2 , a = −x,
and b = 0) we get
|ψ6〉 = FGn |ψ5〉 = χ−x(0)√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
χ0(y)|y − x〉
=
1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|y − x〉
Finally, applying the U2x : |z〉 7→ |z + x+ x〉 unitary gate to this state,
we get back our original state
|ψ〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|y + x〉
with a slight modification of the above proof, we have
Theorem 3.1. Suppose C1 and C2 are [n, k1, d1]G and [n, k2, d2]G codes
with C2 ≤ C1, let V = {v1, . . . , vk} be the set of representatives of the
quotient group C1/C2, then the k = k1k2 mutually orthogonal states
|ψi〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|y + vi〉
are a basis for a quantum error correction code C ≤ H⊗n, where H =
CG is the group algebra of G. The code can simultaneously correct at
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least ⌊d1−1
2
⌋ spin flip errors and ⌊d2−1
2
⌋ phase flip errors. Its minimum
distance is d ≥ mind1, d2. We denote this QECC by CSSG(C1, C2) or
[[n, k, d]]G.
4. a quantum error correction protocol
In this section we use a version of the quantum error correction code
CSSG(C1, C2) to write a quantum error correction protocol similar to
the protocol introduced in [CS] (for the case G = F2). Let C1 and C2
be as in the Theorem 3.1, for each x ∈ C⊥1 and z ∈ C2 consider the
quantum error correction code CSSz,xG (C1, C2) with codeword states
|ψv,z,x〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
w∈C2
χz(w)|v + w + x〉
where v ranges over the representatives of the |C1|/|C2| cosets of C2 in
C1 (we use the notation [v] as an abbriviation for the coset v+C2. Note
that the number of these states is
|C1|/|C2|.|C2|.|C⊥1 | = |Gn| = |G|n
We show that these states are mutually orthogonal, and therefore form
a basis for an |G|n-dimensional vector space.
Lemma 4.1.
∑
z∈C2
|ψv,z,x〉〈ψv,z,x| =
∑
w∈C2
|v + w + x〉〈v + w + x|
Proof Using Lemma 2.2 applied to Gn (with H = C2 and x =
w1 − w2) we have
∑
z∈C2
|ψv,z,x〉〈ψv,z,x| = 1|C2|
∑
z∈C2
∑
w1,w2∈C2
χz(w1 − w2)|v + w1 + x〉〈v + w2 + x|
=
∑
w1,w2∈C2
( 1
|C2|
∑
z∈C2
χw1−w2(z)
)|v + w1 + x〉〈v + w2 + x|
=
∑
w1,w2∈C2
δw1,w2|v + w1 + x〉〈v + w2 + x|
=
∑
w∈C2
|v + w + x〉〈v + w + x|.QED
Let us use the abbreviation
∑
v,z,x to denote the summation over all
[v] ∈ C1/C2, z ∈ C2, and x ∈ C⊥1 .
Lemma 4.2.
∑
v,z,x |ψv,z,x〉〈ψv,z,x| = I, the identity operator on CGn.
By above lemma∑
v,z,x
|ψv,z,x〉〈ψv,z,x| =
∑
v,x
∑
w∈C2
|v + w + x〉〈v + w + x|
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but each y ∈ Gn has a unique decomposition y = v + w + x, for some
[v] ∈ C1/C2, w ∈ C2, and x ∈ C⊥1 . Therefore the last sum is the same as∑
y∈Gn
|y〉〈y| = I.QED
A similar argument proves
Lemma 4.3.
∑
v,z,x |ψv,z,x〉|ψv,z,x〉 =
∑
y∈Gn |y〉|y〉.
Now we are ready to present our quantum error correction proto-
col. It is based on the modified Lo-Chau protocol[LC] and follows the
presentation of a similar construction as reported in [NC]. It uses our
quantum error correction code to perform entanglement distillation.
The basic difference here is the meaning of a ”qubit”. For us a qubit is
a basis element of H = CG, namely a state of the form |t〉, where t ∈ G
(bit has a similar meaning). Also let us remind that the standard basis
of H is {|t〉 : t ∈ G}. So for the given finite abelian group G, we have
the following protocol.
QKD protocol: CSSG codes
1: Alice creates n random check bits, a random m bit key k, and two
random n bit strings x and z. She encodes |k〉 in the code CSSz,xG (C1, C2).
She also encodes n qubits according to the check bits.
2: Alice randomely chooses n positions (out of 2n) and puts the
check qubits in these positions and the encoded qubits in the remaining
positions.
3: Alice selects a random 2n bit string b and performs a Fourier
transform FG on each qubit for which b is not 0 (0 is the identity of
G).
4: Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
5: Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this fact.
6: Alice announces b, z, x, and which n qubits are to provide check
bits.
7: Bob performs the Fourier transform on the qubits where b is not
0.
8: Bob measures the n check qubits in the standard basis, and pub-
licly shares the results with Alice. If more than t of these disagree,
they abort the protocol.
9: Bob decodes the remaining n qubits from CSSz,xG (C1, C2).
10: Bob measures his qubits to obtain the shared secret key k.
A series of remarks are in order. We have emplyed CSSG(C1, C2)
code, which we assumed to encode m qubits in n qubits and correct
up to t errors. The Alice’s n EPR pair state may be written as the
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equal states given in Lemma 4.3. Note the lables are separated to
indicate the qubits Alice keeps, and the ones she sends to Bob. If Alice
wants to measure her remaining qubits according to the check matrix
for CSSG(C1, C2), she obtains random values for x and z, and if she
wants to measure the m EPR pair in the standard basis, she obtains
a random choice of v. Then the remaining n qubits are left in the
state |ψv,z,x〉, which is the codeword for v in CSSz,xG (C1, C2) and is the
encoded version of the state k〉.
Following [SP], one may do the following modifications in the proto-
col. Bob measures his qubits in the standard basis (which is e version
of the Z basis in the binary case) after decoding so the phase correction
sent as z by Alice is irrelevant. Therefore, instead of decoding and then
measuring, Bob can immidiately measure to obtain v + w + x (up to
some error), then decode (classically ) as follows. He can subtract the
annonced value of x and coorect the result to a codeword in C1, which
would be v + w if the distance of the code is not exceeded. Then the
key k is the coset v+w+ C2 in C1. Now as Alice need not reveal z, she
is effectively sending a mixed state averaged over random values of z,
which by Lemma 4.1 is
1
|G|n
∑
w∈C2
|v + w + x〉〈v + w + x|
To create this state, Alice only needs to choose w ∈ C2 randomely
and construct |v + w + x〉 with her random values of x and k. Also if
Alice happens to choose v ∈ C1 (rather than [v] ∈ C1/C2), then w is
unnecessary. In this case, Alice may choose x at random, send |x〉 so
that Bob receives and measures x (with some error), then Alice sends
x− v, which is subtracted by Bob to obtain v (with some error). This
leaves no difference between the random check bits and the code bits.
Finally to avoid the performance of the Fourier transform by Alice, she
can encode her qubits in the standard basis {|t〉 : t ∈ G} or the Fourier
basis {|χt〉 : t ∈ G}, according to the bits of b, where
|χt〉 = 1|G|
∑
s∈G
χt(s)|s〉
Then Bob could measure the received qubits randomely in the stan-
dard or Fourier bases. When Alice subsequently annonces b, they can
keep only those bits for which their bases were the same. As they are
most likely to discard half of their bits, they should start with a little
more than twice the number of original random bits. This way Alice
can delay her choice of check bits until after discarding. This allows
us to avoid the use of quantum memory and perform the encoding
and decoding classically. Summing up we have the following version of
BB84, adapted to the group G.
QKD protocol: BB84G codes
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1: Alice creates (4 + δ)n random bits.
2: Alice creates for each bit a qubit in the standard or Fourier basis,
according to a random bit string b (uses standard basis if at bits for
which b is 0, and the Fourier basis otherwise).
3: Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
4: Alice chooses a random v ∈ C1.
5: Bob receives the qubits, publicly announces this fact, and mea-
sures each in the standard or Fourier basis at random.
6: Alice announces b.
7: Alice and Bob discard those bits Bob measured in a basis other
than the one instructed by b. With high probability, there are at least
2n bits left (if not abort the protocol). Alice decides randomely on a
set of 2n bits to continue to use, randomely selects n of these to be
check bits, and announces the selecrtion.
8: Alice and Bob publicly compare their check bits. If more than t
of these disagree, they abort the protocol. Alice is left with the n bit
string x, and Bob with x+ ε.
9: Alice annonces x−v. Bob subtracts this from his result, correcting
it with code C1 to obtain v.
10: Alice and Bob compute the coset v + C2 in C1/C2 to obtain the
key k.
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